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Abstract
Collective decision-making is ubiquitous across biological systems. However, biases
at the individual level can impair the quality of collective decisions. One such prime bias
is the human tendency to underestimate quantities. Former research on social influence
in human estimation tasks has generally focused on the exchange of single estimates,
showing that randomly exchanging single estimates does not reduce the underestima-
tion bias. Here we performed estimation experiments to test whether leveraging prior
knowledge about this bias when designing the structure of information exchange can
attenuate its effects. Participants had to estimate a series of quantities twice. After pro-
viding a personal estimate, they received estimates from one or several group members,
and could revise their personal estimate. Our purpose was threefold: (i) to investigate
whether restructuring the information exchange can reduce the underestimation bias,
(ii) to study how the number of estimates exchanged affects accuracy, and (iii) to shed
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light on the mechanisms underlying the integration of multiple pieces of social informa-
tion. Our results show that leveraging prior knowledge about the underestimation bias
allows to select and exchange the estimates that are most likely to attenuate its effects.
Crucially, this exchange method operates without any reference to the truth. Moreover,
we find that exchanging more than one estimate also reduces the underestimation bias.
Underlying these results are a human tendency to herd, to trust large numbers more
than small numbers, and to follow disparate social information less. Using a computa-
tional modeling approach, we demonstrate that these effects are indeed key to explain
our experimental results. We then use the model to explore the conditions under which
estimation accuracy can be improved further. Overall, our results show that existing
knowledge on biases can be used to boost collective decision-making, paving the way
for combating other cognitive biases threatening collective systems.
Author Summary
It is well-known that humans are subject to a variety of cognitive biases that hamper the
quality of their decisions. Here we study the possibility to attenuate the effects of such biases,
by selecting the pieces of social information exchanged in groups in a way that dampens
their effects. We focus on the underestimation bias, a human tendency to systematically
underestimate quantities. In estimation experiments, participants were asked to estimate
quantities before and after receiving one or several estimates from other group members. We
varied the number of estimates exchanged, and their selection method. Our results show that
prior knowledge on the underestimation bias can be leveraged to select the estimates which,
once exchanged, are most likely to counter its effects, thus leading to improved accuracy.
Moreover, when exchanging multiple estimates, participants are able to discriminate their
quality, and use social information selectively. We introduce a model which reproduces well
the empirical results, and shows that they rely on three key mechanisms of social information
integration. The strategy used here to reduce the detrimental effects of the underestimation
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bias proved successful, hinting to the possibility to develop similar strategies in different
contexts, in order to impede other cognitive biases.
Introduction
Human and animal decision-making is characterized by a plethora of biases [1, 2], such as
pessimism, optimism and overconfidence [3]. Such biases, while often rational at the indi-
vidual level, can have negative consequences at the collective level. For instance, Mahmoodi
et al. showed that the human tendency to give equal weight to the opinions of individuals
with different competences (equality bias) leads to sub-optimal collective decision-making [4].
Understanding the role of biases in collective systems is becoming increasingly important in
modern digital societies. The recent advent and soar of information technology has sub-
stantially altered human interactions, in particular how social information is exchanged and
processed: people share content and opinions with thousands of contacts on social networks
such as Facebook and Twitter [5, 6, 7], and rate and comment on sellers and products on
websites like Amazon, TripAdvisor and AirBnB [8, 9, 10]. While this new age of social in-
formation exchange carries potentialities for enhanced collaborative work [11] and collective
intelligence [12, 13, 14, 15], it also bears the risks of amplifying existing biases. For instance,
the tendency to favor interactions with like-minded people (ingroup bias) is reinforced by rec-
ommender systems, enhancing the emergence of echo chambers [22] and filter bubbles [23],
thereby further increasing the risks of opinion polarization. Given the importance of the
role of biases in social systems, it is important to develop strategies that can reduce their
detrimental impact on collective decisions.
One promising, yet hitherto untested, strategy to reduce the detrimental impact of biases
on the collective level is to directly leverage prior knowledge about specific biases when
designing the structure of social interactions. Here, we will test whether such a strategy
can indeed be employed to reduce the negative effect of a bias on the collective level. We
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use the framework of estimation tasks, which are well-suited to quantitative studies of social
interactions [24, 25, 26, 27], and focus on the underestimation bias. The underestimation bias
is a well-documented, robust human tendency to underestimate quantities, observed across
many domains, including perception, pricing and risk judgment [27, 44, 28, 29, 30]. The
seminal study by Lorenz et al. (2011) has suggested that the effects of the underestimation
bias, indeed, could be amplified after social interactions in human groups, and deteriorate
collective decision-making.
We here investigate the effect of different exchange structures, aimed at counteracting the
underestimation bias (see below for details), on individual and collective accuracy. Moreover,
we investigate how these exchange structures interact with the number of estimates exchanged
in shaping accuracy. Previous research on estimation tasks has largely overlooked both of
these factors. Thus far, research on estimation tasks mostly discussed the beneficial or
detrimental effects of social influence on group performance [26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36].
However, most previous studies focused on the impact of a single piece of information (one
estimate or the average of several estimates), or did not systematically vary their number;
and, in most studies, subjects received social information from randomly selected individuals
(either group members, or participants from former experiments) [24, 25, 26, 27, 32, 35, 36,
37, 38]. One exception is King et al., who showed that providing individuals with the most
accurate estimate in a sequential estimation task resulted in higher accuracy than providing
a random previous estimate [35]. However, this design requires a priori knowledge about the
true value of the quantity to estimate, contrasting most realistic situations. In contrast to
these previous works, in most daily choices one generally considers not only one, but several
sources of information, and these sources are rarely chosen randomly [39]. Even when not
actively selecting information sources, one routinely experiences recommended content (e.g.
books on Amazon, movies on Netflix or videos on Youtube) generated by algorithms which
incorporate our “tastes” (i.e. previous choices) and that of (similar) others [40].
Following these observations, we confronted groups with a series of estimation tasks, in
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which individuals re-evaluated their estimates, after having received a varying number of
estimates τ (τ = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11) from other group members. Crucially, the exchanged
estimates were selected in three different manners:
• Random exchange: subjects received personal estimates from random other group mem-
bers. Former research showed that when a single estimate is randomly exchanged, individual
accuracy improves because estimates converge, but collective accuracy does not [26, 27]. Since
several random estimates do not, on average, carry higher information quality than a single
random estimate, we did not expect collective accuracy to improve when exchanging multiple
random estimates. However, we predicted that increasing the number of estimates exchanged
would lead to a higher imitation rate and thus to an increase in individual accuracy.
• Median exchange: in estimation tasks, median estimates are often closer to the true
value than randomly selected estimates (Wisdom of Crowds) [41, 42, 43]. In this exchange
treatment, each participant received, as social information, the estimates which logarithms1
were closest to the median log estimate m of the group (except their own). The selected
estimates being on average closer to the truth than in the Random exchange, we expected
higher collective and individual improvements.
• Shifted-Median exchange: as detailed above, humans have a tendency to underesti-
mate quantities. Recent works have suggested aggregation measures taking this bias into
account [44], or the possibility to counteract it using artificially generated social informa-
tion [27]. Building on this, we here design a method that exploits prior knowledge on the
underestimation bias, to select estimates that are likely to reduce its effects. We define, for
each group and each question, a shifted (overestimated) value m′ of the median log estimate
m that approximates the log of the true value T (thus compensating the underestimation
bias), using a relationship between m and log(T ) identified from prior studies (see details in
Materials and Methods). Individuals received the estimates which logarithms were closest to
m′ (except their own), and we expected here the highest collective and individual improve-
1The use of logarithms is preferable because of the human logarithmic perception of numbers (see Materials
and Methods).
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ments. Crucially, only personal estimates are used to compute m′, without any reference to
the true value. That is, the accuracy of the selected estimates is a priori unknown, and only
statistically expected to be closer to the truth.
We find that, unexpectedly, both collective and individual accuracy improve when more
estimates are randomly exchanged, and that collective accuracy is not significantly better in
the Median exchange than in the Random exchange. However, in accordance with our pre-
diction, both collective and individual accuracy are boosted in the Shifted-Median exchange
compared to the Random exchange, thus successfully counteracting the underestimation bias.
We unveil three key mechanisms underlying these results, and develop a model to analyse
the conditions under which collective and individual improvements can be optimised.
Materials and Methods
Experimental Design
Participants were 216 students, distributed over 18 groups of 12 individuals. Each individual
was confronted with 36 estimation questions (see the list in SI Appendix) on a tactile tablet.
Each question was asked twice: first, subjects were asked to provide their personal estimate
Ep. Next, they received as social information the estimate(s) of one or several group mem-
ber(s), and were asked to provide a second estimate Es (see illustration in Supplementary
Fig. S1). When providing social information, we varied (i) the number of estimates shown
(τ = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 or 11) and (ii) how they were selected (Random, Median or Shifted-Median
exchange). Each group of 12 individuals experienced each of the 18 unique treatments (i.e.
combination of number of estimates exchanged and exchange structure) twice. Across all 18
groups, each of the 36 unique questions was asked once at every unique treatment combina-
tion. Students received course credits for participation and were, additionally, incentivised
based on their performance. Full experimental details can be found in the Supplementary
Information.
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Compensating the Underestimation Bias
When considering large values, humans tend to think logarithmically rather than linearly [45],
therefore the logarithms of estimates are the natural quantity to consider in estimation
tasks [27]. The mean or median of log estimates is often used to measure the quality of
collective decisions in such tasks (Wisdom of Crowds). Since distributions of log estimates
for most quantities are closer to Laplace distributions than to Gaussian distributions [46],
the median is more reliable than the mean2 in estimating the Wisdom of Crowds [47].
Fig. 1a shows that there exists a linear relationship (data were taken from a previous
study [27]) between the median log estimate m and the log of the true value: m ∼ γ log(T ),
where γ is the slope of the relationship (the “shifted-median parameter”). Note that γ < 1
denotes the underestimation bias.
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Figure 1: Linear Relationship between the Median Log Estimate and the Log of the
Correct Answer :
Median of the logarithm of estimates against the logarithm of the correct answer for (a) 98 questions
(one dot per question) taken from a former study [27] and (b, c) 36 questions from the current
experiment. Among the 36 questions, 18 were already asked in the above cited study (b) and 18
were new (c). The slopes of the linear regression lines are 0.89 (a), 0.88 (b) and 0.91 (c), underlining
the robustness of this linear trend. Notice that slopes lower than 1 reflect the underestimation bias.
We used this relationship to construct, for each group and each question, a value m′ (the
“shifted-median value”) aimed to compensate the underestimation bias, i.e. to approximate
the (log of the) truth: m′ = m/γ ∼ log(T ), with γ = 0.9. m′ then served as a reference to
2The median and the mean are the maximum likelihood estimators of the center of Laplace and Gaussian
distributions, respectively.
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select the estimates provided to the subjects in the Shifted-Median exchange.
Visual inspection confirms that the identified linear relationship not only holds for the
same questions as in the previous study (half of our questions; Fig. 1b), but also carries over
to new questions (other half; Fig. 1c), underlining its consistency. Crucially, our method
does not require the a priori knowledge of the truth. Data sets including all questions and
participants’ answers, for each exchange condition and number of estimates exchanged, are
included as Supplementary Material.
Results
Following [27], we define (i) collective accuracy as
∣∣Mediani,q( log(Ei,qTq ))∣∣, where Ei,q is
the individual i’s estimate of the quantity q and Tq the true value of the same quantity,
and (ii) individual accuracy as Mediani,q
(∣∣ log(Ei,q
Tq
)
∣∣). Collective accuracy measures how
close the median deviation from the truth is to 0 (i.e. no deviation), and individual accu-
racy measures how close individual deviations from the truth are to 0 on average. Fig. 2
shows the relative improvements in collective and individual accuracy after social informa-
tion exchange, as a function of the number of estimates exchanged, for all three exchange
structures. 0 implies no improvement (i.e. collective/individual accuracy do not change),
and 1 maximum improvement (i.e. collective/individual accuracy correspond to the truth
after social information exchange). An improvement in collective accuracy (Fig. 2a) amounts
to a shift of the median log estimates toward the truth, which is perforce accompanied by an
improvement in individual accuracy (Fig. 2b), as estimates get on average closer to the truth
as well. However, there can be individual improvement without collective improvement (i.e.
without a shift), if estimates converge after social information exchange, as shown in [27].
In the Random and Median exchanges, collective improvement increases with the number
of estimates exchanged τ (Fig. 2a). In the Shifted-median exchange, collective improvement
is substantially higher than in the other two treatments at low values of τ , and decreases with
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Figure 2: Improvement in Collective and Individual Accuracy after Social Informa-
tion Exchange : Relative improvement in (a) collective accuracy and (b) individual accuracy,
against the number of estimates exchanged, in the Random (black), Median (blue) and Shifted-
Median (red) exchanges. Positive/negative values indicate that (collective or individual) accuracy
improved/declined. Dots and error bars (computed using a bootstrap procedure described in the
Supplementary Information) show empirical data. Lines are model simulations.
increasing τ . Individual improvement also increases with τ in the Random exchange (though
it is unexpectedly high for τ = 1), and shows an inverse-U shaped curve in the Median
and Shifted-median exchanges, peaking at intermediate levels of τ (Fig. 2b). It is generally
higher in the Median and Shifted-median exchanges than in the Random exchange. Notice
that values expectedly converge when 11 estimates are exchanged for all three exchange
structures, since subjects receive the same information, i.e. all pieces of information (group
size was 12). We next describe three central mechanisms of social information use underlying
these patterns.
Mechanisms Underlying the Integration of Several Estimates
Coherently with heuristic strategies under time and computational limitations [48, 49, 50], we
assume that subjects intuitively (and rapidly) perceive the central tendency and dispersion of
the estimates they receive as social information. Consistent with the logarithmic perception
of numbers [45], we assume that this perception takes the form of their geometric mean and
geometric standard deviation, respectively3.
3Which amounts to perceiving the arithmetic mean and standard deviation of the logs (i.e. of the orders
of magnitude).
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This allows us to define a measure of the value subjects assign to the social information,
as the weight S they give to the geometric mean G of the social information4. We define
a subject’s second estimate Es as the weighted geometric average of their personal estimate
Ep and the geometric mean G of the social information: Es = Ep
1−S · GS. S can thus be
expressed as S = log(Es)−log(Ep)
log(G)−log(Ep) .
S = 0 thus implies that a subject keeps their personal estimate (Es = Ep), i.e. that they
discard social information, and S = 1 implies that their second estimate equals the geometric
mean (Es = G), i.e. that they follow the central tendency of the social information.
Herding effect: tendency to partially copy social information
Fig. 3 shows that the average weight given to the social information is on average strictly
between 0 and 1, at all combinations of exchange structure and number of estimates ex-
changed. This individual tendency to partially follow social information leads to a conver-
gence of estimates, which translates into individual improvement (Fig. 2b) [27]. We call this
the herding effect .
The large collective improvement observed in the Shifted-Median (but not Median) ex-
change at low values of τ as compared to the Random exchange, is a consequence of this
imitation tendency. In the Shifted-Median exchange the estimates received were on aver-
age higher than in the Random exchange, due to their selection process (the shifted-median
value compensates the underestimation bias). Since subjects weighted social information,
for 1 ≤ τ ≤ 7, at least as much in the Shifted-Median exchange (dots in Fig. 3c) as in the
Random exchange (dots in Fig. 3a), their second estimates shifted toward higher values than
in the Random exchange, resulting in the higher collective improvement observed.
Asymmetry effect: differential weighting of social information
Fig. 3 also shows that subjects weigh social information more when it is higher than
their personal estimate (squares) than when it is lower (triangles). This is the asymmetry
4This generalises other measures of social influenceability commonly used when social information consists
of a single number (one estimate or the average of several estimates) [36, 38, 27].
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Figure 3: Herding and Asymmetry effects: average weight given to the social information,
against the number of estimates exchanged, in the (a) Random, (b) Median and (c) Shifted-Median
exchange treatments. Shown are the values when (i) all data are combined (dots), (ii) social
information is higher than the personal estimate (squares) and (iii) social information is lower
than the personal estimate (triangles). Filled symbols and empty symbols (accompanied with lines
to facilitate visualisation) indicate the values obtained from the data and the model simulations,
respectively. Subjects give on average a weight strictly between 0 and 1 to the social information
(herding effect), and weigh social information more when it is higher than their personal estimate
than when it is lower (asymmetry effect).
effect , which results in a shift of subjects’ second estimates toward higher values, and hence
closer to the truth. This effect increases with the number τ of estimates exchanged (it is null
or negligible when τ = 1), resulting in the increased improvement in collective accuracy with
τ , in the Random and Median exchanges (Fig. 2a, black and blue dots). This effect is also
present in the Shifted-Median exchange (Fig. 3c), but is outweighed by the herding effect in
this treatment. The herding and asymmetry effects explain all the collective improvement
patterns (Fig. 2a), and the improvement in individual accuracy with increasing τ in the
Random exchange (Fig. 2b). However, they are insufficient to explain the higher weight
given to the social information (when it is lower than personal estimates) in the Median
and Shifted-Median exchanges compared to the Random exchange (Fig. 3), and relatedly,
the higher levels of individual improvement in these exchanges. These are driven by a third
effect.
Similarity effect: similar estimates are weighted higher
Because of the selective sampling in the Median and Shifted-Median exchanges, the pieces
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of social information are closer to each other in these exchange treatments than in the Random
exchange, especially when few estimates are exchanged. Fig. 4a shows that the dispersion of
the estimates received as social information (defined as their geometric standard deviation)
is indeed lower on average in the Median and Shifted-Median exchanges than in the Random
exchange, i.e. the estimates received are on average more similar to each other.
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Figure 4: Similarity effect : (a) Mean dispersion (geometric standard deviation) of the estimates
exchanged as social information, against their number, in the Random (black), Median (blue) and
Shifted-Median (red) exchanges. Dots and error bars correspond to the data, and lines to the model
simulations. The dispersion is significantly lower in the Median and Shifted-Median exchanges than
in the Random exchange, especially when few estimates were exchanged. Notice that a single piece
of information has no dispersion. (b) Average weight given to the geometric mean of the pieces
of social information against their mean dispersion. Each dot corresponds to a specific number
of estimates exchanged (3 to 11). The dashed line is a linear regression for all points combined.
Filled dots correspond to the data, and empty dots to the model simulations. Subjects weigh social
information more if the dispersion of estimates is lower (i.e. if estimates are more similar).
Moreover, Fig. 4b shows that subjects weigh social information more at lower levels
of dispersion, i.e. higher levels of similarity : we call this the similarity effect . This
effect explains the higher weight given to the social information in the Median and Shifted-
Median exchanges, when 3 to 5 (and to a lesser extent 7) estimates are exchanged (Fig. 3),
which entails a higher convergence of estimates and thereby a higher individual improvement
(Fig. 2b). Using an incremental modelling approach, we next emphasise the importance of
these mechanisms in explaining the data.
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Models of Social Information Integration
The basic model (“model 0”) is based on the model developed in [27]: the average weight
〈S〉 agents give to the social information increases linearly with the distance between their
personal estimate and the geometric mean of the social information. This is the distance
effect, evidenced in [27] (where subjects received the geometric mean of other group members’
estimates as social information) and observed in our data as well (see Supplementary Fig. S6).
However, the model 0 is unable to capture several of the empirical relationships observed in
our data (see Supplementary Fig. S7 left column).
Including the asymmetry effect (“model 1”), as a linear dependence of the average weight
〈S〉 given to the social information on the number of estimates exchanged τ , allows to account
for the increasing collective improvement observed with τ . However, the model heavily
underestimates the average weight given to the social information when it is lower than
personal estimates in the Median and Shifted-Median exchanges (see Supplementary Fig. S8
top line). Only after adding the similarity effect (“model 2”), as a linear dependence of 〈S〉 on
the dispersion of estimates, can we solve this problem and obtain a model that satisfyingly
reproduces all the main patterns observed in the data (dotted lines and open symbols in
Figs. 2–4).
Note that all effects are acting independently, and the herding effect arises from the
average weight 〈S〉 given to the social information being strictly between 0 and 1—which
only depends on the parametrisation, and need thus not be explicitly put into the model.
Full details are presented in SI Appendix.
Optimising Collective and Individual Improvements
We next use the model to explore the impact of varying group sizes and shifted-median
parameter values γ on individual and collective improvement in the Shifted-Median exchange.
Fig. 5a shows that the highest collective improvement is expected when the shifted-median
slightly overestimates the truth (γ ≈ 0.76 for groups of 12 individuals; orange dots) instead
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of approximating it (γ ≈ 0.9, as we aimed for; red dots). Note that γ = 1 corresponds to the
Median exchange (i.e. the median is not shifted; blue dots).
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Figure 5: Model Simulations: (a) Collective (filled dots) and individual (empty dots) improve-
ments, averaged over all values of τ for groups of size 12 (i.e. τ = 1, 2...11), as a function of
the shifted-median parameter γ. The blue and red dots correspond respectively to the Median
and Shifted-Median exchanges, as predicted by the model, while the orange dots show the highest
average collective improvement (obtained at γ = 0.76) and the corresponding value for individual
improvement. (b) Optimal number τ of estimates exchanged, to maximise collective (filled dots)
or individual (empty dots) improvements, for different group sizes at optimal values of γ. Dashed
red lines are linear fits with slopes of about 0.24 for collective improvement and 0.58 for individual
improvement.
The highest individual improvement occurs when γ ≈ 0.9, but the difference with γ ≈
0.76 is so small that the latter should be preferred in order to maximise both collective
and individual improvements. Surprisingly, our simulations predict that both improvements
remain relatively high when the shifted-median overestimates the truth (γ < 0.9), but decay
fast if the shifted-median underestimates it (γ > 0.9).
The optimum value of γ and corresponding maximum achievable improvement (Supple-
mentary Fig. S9) are largely independent of group size for individual improvement. However,
for collective improvement, both values increase with group size up to groups of about 30
individuals, at which point they stabilise. Interestingly, the saturation value (γ ≈ 0.86) cor-
responds to a shifted-median that would only very slightly overestimate the truth, suggesting
that the larger the group size, the less social information needs to overestimate the truth (i.e.
compensate the underestimation bias) for maximising collective accuracy.
Finally, Fig. 5b shows that the optimal number of estimates to exchange (for achieving
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maximum individual or collective improvement) scales linearly with group size.
Discussion
We studied the impact of the number of estimates exchanged within a group, and their
exchange structure, on collective and individual accuracy in estimation tasks, and identified
three central mechanisms underlying social information integration:
(i) subjects tended to partially copy each other (herding effect), leading to a convergence
of estimates after social information exchange, and therefore to an improvement in individual
accuracy. Note that, contrary to popular opinion, convergence of estimates need not yield
negative outcomes (like impairing the Wisdom of Crowds [26, 32, 36]): even if the average
opinion is biased, exchanging opinions may temper extreme ones and improve the overall
quality of decisions. This tendency to follow social information has another important conse-
quence: it is possible to influence the outcome of collective estimation processes in a desired
direction. In the Shifted-Median exchange, we showed that subjects’ second estimates could
be “pulled” towards the truth, thus improving collective accuracy. But subjects’ estimates
could be “pushed” away from the truth as well (see Supplementary Fig. S2). This is an
example of nudging, also demonstrated in other contexts [51].
(ii) subjects were more influenced by higher estimates (than their own) than by lower
estimates (asymmetry effect). This resulted in a shifting of second estimates toward higher
values, thereby partly compensating the underestimation bias, even in the Random exchange.
Collective accuracy was thus found to improve after several estimates were exchanged, in
constrast with former findings [26]. Although the asymmetry effect remarkably explains
this improvement, it is likely that it is a consequence of some more fundamental cognitive
processes. A possible (at least partial) explanation could be that it results from “people’s
difficulty to reason about magnitudes outside of human perception” [52]. Indeed, people
generally deal with small quantities, typically below one thousand (e.g. number of persons or
15
objects, monetary transactions, sports statistics...), and on much fewer occasions face larger
scale numbers (e.g. populations, state level budgets, very high incomes...). They also have no
direct experience with astronomical or geological events. It is thus possible that people find
it easier to assess the reliability of relatively low numbers as compared to very high numbers,
making it more frequent that subjects distrust lower estimates (than their own) than higher
estimates. Moreover, even though people apprehend large numbers poorly, they usually know
that such quantities are supposed to be large. It is therefore conceivable that people are more
likely to assume to have underestimated such quantities than to have overestimated them,
as a consequence of which they are more likely to follow higher estimates (than their own)
than lower estimates. But whatever its origin, the asymmetry effect suggests that people
are able to selectively use social information in order to counterbalance the underestimation
bias, even without external intervention (like in the Random exchange).
(iii) subjects are sensitive to the dispersion of the estimates received, and follow the
social information more when the estimates are more similar to each other (similarity effect),
thus increasing the convergence of estimates after social information exchange. Former work
has shown that similarity in individuals’ decisions correlates with decision accuracy [53],
suggesting that following pieces of social information more when they are more similar is
a reliable strategy to increase the quality of one’s decisions. Our selection method in the
Median and Shifted-Median exchanges thus counterbalances a human tendency to underuse
social information [27, 54, 55], and entails higher individual improvement than in the Random
exchange.
Next, we developed an agent-based model aimed to emphasise the importance of these
three effects—plus the distance effect—in explaining the patterns observed. The model as-
sumes that subjects have a fast and intuitive perception of the central tendency and dispersion
of the estimates they receive as social information, coherent with heuristic strategies under
time and computational constraints [48, 49, 50]. The model further assumes that the effects
are independent and linearly related to the average weight given to the social information.
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It is conceivable that the strategies used by people when integrating up to 11 pieces of social
information in their decision making process are very diverse and complex. Yet, despite its
relative simplicity, our model is in fair agreement with the data, underlining the core role of
these effects in integrating several estimates.
We then used our model to explore how the Shifted-Median exchange procedure could op-
timise collective and individual improvements, by varying the group size and shifted-median
parameter γ. The model predicts that groups can reach highest collective improvement if
the shifted-median value overestimates the truth (γ ≈ 0.76 for a group size of 12) instead of
approximating it (γ ≈ 0.9), and that collective and individual improvements rapidly decline
if social information underestimates the truth, but not if social information overestimates it.
These results are in line with earlier work on social influence [47], and suggest that favouring
high estimates over low estimates at the individual level is a robust strategy to optimise the
collective benefits. Our simulations further show that as group size increases, the amount of
overestimation (in the shifted-median value) needed to maximise collective accuracy decreases
and saturates close to the truth (γ ≈ 0.86) for groups exceeding 30 individuals. Moreover, we
found that the optimal number of estimates to be exchanged, in order to optimise collective
and individual accuracy, increases linearly with the group size. For groups of 30 individuals,
our model predicts that 8 estimates should be exchanged, which is reasonable in terms of
cognitive capacities. Finally, our simulations suggest that by tuning the number of estimates
to be exchanged and the shifted-median parameter according to the group size, it is possible
to achieve almost perfect collective accuracy (i.e. relative improvement of 1).
To conclude, our findings show that (i) it is possible to leverage prior knowledge on cogni-
tive biases to lessen their effects, by organising the exchange of social information in groups in
a way that counterbalances them, (ii) people’s decisions can be nudged in a desired direction
and (iii) there exists an optimal amount of information to share among group members in
order to maximise the quality of their decisions, and this amount is predictable. Our results
were derived within the paradigm of estimation tasks. Yet, we believe that the mechanisms
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underlying social information use in estimation tasks share important commonalities with
related domains (e.g. opinion dynamics [56]), such that the conclusions presented here may
be adapted to other domains. Hence, future work could adapt our findings to online recom-
mendation systems (e.g. in Facebook, Youtube or Netflix) or page ranking algorithms (e.g.
in Google, Yahoo or DuckDuckGo), by selecting the amount and type of content presented to
the users. This could potentially work against filter bubbles and echo chambers, and reduce
the effects of well-known biases such as the confirmation [57] or overconfidence bias [58].
References
[1] Bateson, M., Desire, S., Gartside, S.E., Wright, G.A. (2011) Agitated Honeybees Exhibit
Pessimistic Cognitive Biases. Current Biology 21(12):1070–1073.
[2] Ehrlinger J, Kim B (2016) Decision-making and cognitive biases. DOI: 10.1016/B978-
0-12-397045-9.00206-8
[3] Marshall, J.A.R., Trimmer, P.C., Houston, A.I., McNamara, J.M. (2013) On evolution-
ary explanations of cognitive biases. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 28(8):469–473.
[4] Mahmoodi A, et al. (2015) Equality bias impairs collective decision-making across cul-
tures. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the USA 112(12):3835–3840.
[5] Cha M, et al. (2010) Measuring user influence in twitter: The million follower fallacy.
Proceedings of the Fourth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media
pp. 10–17.
[6] Jansen BJ, et al. (2009) Twitter power: Tweets as electronic word of mouth. Journal
of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 60(11):2169–2188.
[7] Gonc¸alves B, Perra N (2015) Social phenomena: From data analysis to models. (Heidel-
berg, New-York: Springer International Publishing AG.).
18
[8] Cheng M, Jin X (2019) What do airbnb users care about? an analysis of online review
comments. International Journal of Hospitality Management 76(A):58–70.
[9] Schafer JB, Konstan JA, Riedl J (2001) E-commerce recommendation applications. Data
Mining and Knowledge Discovery 5(1–2):115–153.
[10] O’Connor P (2008) User-generated content and travel: A case study on tripadvisor.com.
Information and Communication Technologies in Tourism 2008 pp. 47–58.
[11] Fowler JH, Christakis NA (2010) Cooperative behavior cascades in human social net-
works. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
107(12):5334–5338.
[12] Salminen J (2012) Collective intelligence in humans: A literature review.
arXiv:1204.3401.
[13] Bonabeau E (2009) Decisions 2.0: the power of collective intelligence. MIT Sloan Man-
agement Review, Cambridge 50(2):45–52.
[14] Woolley AW, Aggarwal I, Malone TW (2015) Collective intelligence and group perfor-
mance. Current Directions in Psychological Science 24(6):420–424.
[15] Kurvers RH, et al. (2016) Boosting medical diagnostics by pooling independent judg-
ments. Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
113(31):8777 – 8782.
[16] Klingberg T (2008) Overflowing Brain: Information Overload and Limits of Working
Memory.
[17] Schick AG, Gordon LA (1990) Information overload: A temporal approach. Accounting,
Organization and Society 15(3):199–220.
19
[18] Lewandowsky S, Ecker UK, Cook J (2017) Beyond misinformation: Understanding and
coping with the “post-truth” era. Journal of App Res in Memory and Cognition 6:353–
369.
[19] Vosoughi S, Roy D, Aral S (2018) The spread of true and false news online. Science
359(6380):1146–1151.
[20] Bond RM, et al. (2012) A 61-million-person experiment in social influence and political
mobilization. Nature 489:295–298.
[21] Hemaspaandra E, Hemaspaandra LA, Rothe J (2014) The complexity of online manipu-
lation of sequential elections. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 80(4):697–710.
[22] Garrett RK (2009) Echo chambers online: Politically motivated selective exposure
among internet news users. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 14(2):265–
285.
[23] Flaxman S, Goel S, Rao JM (2016) Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and online news
consumption. Public Opinion Quarterly 80(Special issue):298–320.
[24] Yaniv I (2004) Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 93(1):1–13.
[25] Soll JB, Larrick RP (2009) Strategies for revising judgment: How (and how well) peo-
ple use others’ opinions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition 35(3):780–805.
[26] Lorenz J, et al. (2011) How social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowd effect.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108(22):9020–9025.
[27] Jayles B, et al. (2017) How social information can improve estimation accuracy in human
groups. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(47):12620–12625.
20
[28] Lichtenstein S, et al. (1978) Judged frequency of lethal events. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 4(6):551–578.
[29] Hertwig R, Pachur T, Kurzenha¨user S (2005) Judgments of risk frequencies: Tests of
possible cognitive mechanisms. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition 31(4):621–642.
[30] Scheibehenne B (2018) The psychophysics of number integration: Evidence from the lab
and from the field. Decision. Advance online publication.
[31] Mavrodiev P, Tessone CJ, Schweitzer F (2013) Quantifying the effects of social influence.
Scientific Reports 3:1360.
[32] Kerckhove CV, et al. (2016) Modelling influence and opinion evolution in online collective
behaviour. PLoS ONE 11(6):e0157685.
[33] Luo Y, Iyengar G, Venkatasubramanian V (2018) Social influence makes self-interested
crowds smarter: an optimal control perspective. IEEE Transactions on Computational
Social Systems 5(1):200–209.
[34] Faria JJ, Dyer JR, Tosh CR, Krause J (2010) Leadership and social information use in
human crowds. Animal Behaviour 79(4).
[35] King AJ, et al. (2012) Is the true ’wisdom of the crowd’ to copy successful individuals?
Biology Letters 8(2):197–200.
[36] Madirolas G, de Polavieja GG (2015) Improving collective estimations using resistance
to social influence. PLOS Computational Biology 11(11):e1004594.
[37] Moussa¨ıd M, et al. (2013) Social influence and the collective dynamics of opinion for-
mation. PLoS ONE 8(11):e78433.
[38] Chacoma A, Zanette DH (2015) Opinion formation by social influence: From experi-
ments to modeling. PLoS One 10(10):e0140406.
21
[39] Rand DG, Arbesman S, Christakis NA (2011) Dynamic social networks promote coop-
eration in experiments with humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of
the United States of America 108(48):19193–19198.
[40] Analytis PP, Barkoczi D, Herzog SM (2018) Social learning strategies for matters of
taste. Nature Human Behavior 2:415–424.
[41] Galton F (1907) Vox populi. Nature 75:450–451.
[42] Surowiecki J (2005) The wisdom of crowds. (Anchor Books, New York, NY).
[43] Herzog SM, Litvinova A, Yahosseini KS, Tump AN, Kurvers RHJM (2019) The ecological
rationality of the wisdom of crowds. (In R. Hertwig, T. J. Pleskac, T. Pachur, & The
Center for Adaptive Rationality, Taming uncertainty (pp. 245–262). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.).
[44] Kao AB, et al. (2018) Counteracting estimation bias and social influence to improve the
wisdom of crowds. Journal of the Royal Society Interface 15(141).
[45] Dehaene S, et al. (2008) Log or linear? distinct intuitions of the number scale in western
and amazonian indigene cultures. Science 320(5880):1217–1220.
[46] Lobo MS, Yao D (2010) Human judgment is heavy tailed: Empirical evidence and
implications for the aggregation of estimates and forecasts. INSEAD working paper
series.
[47] Jayles B (2017) Ph.D. thesis (Universite´ de Toulouse Paul Sabatier). Physics and Society
[physics.soc-ph], tel-01877115.
[48] Tversky A, Kahneman D (1974) Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.
Science 185(4157):1124–1131.
[49] Simon HA (1982) Models of Bounded Rationality. (MIT Press).
22
[50] Gigerenzer G, Gaissmaier W (2011) Heuristic decision making. Annual Review Psychol-
ogy 62:451–482.
[51] Thaler R, Sunstein C (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and
Happiness.
[52] Resnick I, Newcombe NS, Shipley TF (2017) Dealing with big numbers: Representa-
tion and understanding of magnitudes outside of human experience. Cognitive Science
41:1020–1041.
[53] Kurvers RHJM, et al. (2019) How to detect high-performing individu-
als and groups: Decision similarity predicts accuracy. PsyArXiv February
4(https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/ryvnw).
[54] Yaniv I, Kleinberger E (2000) Advice taking in decision making: Egocentric discount-
ing and reputation formation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
83(2):260–281.
[55] Tump AN, Wolf M, Krause J, Kurvers RHJM (2018) Individuals fail to reap the collective
benefits of diversity because of over-reliance on personal information. Journal of the
Royal Society Interface 15:20180155.
[56] Lorenz J (2007) Continuous opinion dynamics under bounded confidence: A survey.
International Journal of Modern Physics C 18(12):1819–1838.
[57] Nickerson RS (1998) Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises.
Review of General Psychology 2(2):175–220.
[58] Dunning D (2012) Self-Insight: Roadblocks and Detours on the Path to Knowing Thyself.
23
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Felix Lappe for programming the experiment, and thank Alan Tump,
Lucienne Eweleit, Klaus Reinhold and Oliver Kru¨ger for their support in the organisation of
our study. We are grateful to the ARC research group for their constructive feedback. This
work was partly funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research
Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy – EXC 2002/1 “Science of Intelligence” –
project number 390523135.
Author contributions
B.J. and R.K. designed research; B.J. and R.K. performed research; B.J. analysed data; B.J.
and R.K. wrote the paper.
Corresponding author
Correspondence to Bertrand Jayles – jayles@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
24
SI Appendix. Belonging to:
Debiasing the crowd: selectively exchanging
social information improves collective
decision-making
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1 Experimental Design
Participants were 216 students, distributed over 18 groups of 12 individuals, from the Bielefeld
University, taking an Introductionary Biology course (16-18 April 2018). Prior to partici-
pation, all participants signed an informed consent form and the experiment was approved
by the Institutional Review Board of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development (A
2018/11).
Each of the 12 subjects—in each of the 18 groups—was confronted with 36 estimation
questions (see the list in section 3) on a tactile tablet (Lenovo TAB 2 A10-30). Each question
was asked twice: first, subjects were asked to provide their personal estimate Ep. Next, they
received as social information the estimate(s) of one or more group members (i.e. other
∗Corresponding author – jayles@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
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subjects in the same room at the same time), and were asked to provide a second estimate
Es. As a reminder, their personal estimate was also shown during the second answering
of a question. Supplementary Fig. S1 illustrates how social information was displayed on
the tablets: on the right side of the screen was a blue panel showing all pieces of social
information, sorted in increasing order. All tablets were controlled by a central server, and
participants could only proceed to the next question once all individuals provided their
estimate. A 30 seconds count down timer was shown on the screen to motivate subjects
to answer within this time window, although they were allowed to take more time. When
Fig. S1: Experimental procedure for an example question. The left panel shows the first
screen in which subjects had to provide their personal estimate. The question was asked on the
first line, and the answer could be typed on the second line, using a keyboard that appeared when
clicking on Ihre Antwort (Your answer in German). Subjects submitted their estimates by pushing
the OK button. A timer was displayed in the top right corner of the screen to remind subjects to
answer within 30 seconds. The right panel shows the second screen in which subjects could revise
their estimate after observing answers from other group members (in this example 5 answers). As
a reminder, the original question, as well as the subject’s personal estimate were shown. Subjects
provided their second estimate in the same way as the first one and the countdown timer was again
set on 30 seconds.
providing social information, we varied (i) the number of estimates selected (1, 3, 5, 7, 9
or 11), and (ii) their exchange procedure (Random, Median and Shifted-Median). In the
Random exchange, subjects received random estimates from their 11 group members. In the
Median exchange, we presented the estimates which logarithm1 was closest to the median of
the logarithms of the 12 personal estimates. In the Shifted-Median exchange, subjects were
1The logarithmic scale is consistent with the logarithmic perception of numbers [43].
2
provided the estimates which logarithm was closest to a shifted (overestimated) value of the
median of the logarithms of estimates (see Main Text, Material and Methods).
Importantly, in all exchange treatments, subject did not receive their own estimate as
social information. In total, there were 6 different numbers of estimates selected × 3 exchange
structure = 18 unique conditions. In every session, the 36 questions were randomly assigned
to six blocks of six questions. Across groups, the order of the blocks, and the questions
within a block, were randomized. A block always contained each number of estimates to
be exchanged (1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11) once and was assigned one of three exchange structures
(Random, Median or Shifted-Median). Each group experienced two blocks of each exchange
treatment, and thus each of the 18 unique treatment conditions twice. The randomization
was constrained in such a way that at the end of the whole experiment, all 36 questions
were asked once in all 18 different conditions, resulting in 36 estimates (1 per question) × 12
subjects = 432 estimates (×2: before and after social information exchange) per condition.
Students received course credits for participation. Additionally, we incentivised them
based on their performance P , defined as:
Pi =
1
2
(
Median q
∣∣∣∣log(Epi,qTq
)∣∣∣∣ + Median q ∣∣∣∣log(Esi,qTq
)∣∣∣∣) ,
where i and q are respectively indexes for individuals and questions, Ep and Es are respec-
tively estimates before (personal) and after (second) social information exchange, and T is
the correct answer to the question. This performance criterion measures the median distance
to the correct answer—in terms of orders of magnitude—over all questions, averaged over the
two estimates (before and after social information exchange). The payments were defined
according to the distribution of performances measured in [27]:
• Pi < 0.4: 5e (∼ 20% of subjects)
• 0.4 ≤ Pi < 0.5: 4e (∼ 30% of subjects)
• Pi ≥ 0.5: 3e (∼ 50% of subjects)
3
2 Pilot Experiment
Prior to the main experiment, we ran a pilot experiment (approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development—A 2019/07), very similar
in design, but with two crucial differences:
(i) the shifted-median was computed using a different method (described below). This
method was more complicated than the one used in the main experiment;
(ii) the selection procedure of estimates in the Median and Shifted-Median exchanges
was based on a linear scale of numbers, i.e. we presented the closest estimates to the me-
dian2/shifted-median of the estimates, which was less consistent with the logarithmic per-
ception of numbers.
This method yielded several unexpected results. In particular, the shifted-median ex-
change treatment worked less well than expected (Supplementary Fig. S2). This motivated
us to refine our experiment, the results of which we present in the main text. Most crucially,
we used the logarithmic scale in the main experiment. Nevertheless, the results from this
pilot experiment are interesting, because they emphasize the importance of using the log
scale when dealing with large numbers. We therefore decided to present them here. No-
tice that nothing changed for the Random exchange of estimates, such that data from both
experiments were combined to produce the Random exchange part of all graphs.
Shifted-Median Value in the Pilot Experiment
Let us introduce log-normalized estimates X = log
(
E
T
)
. We identified a linear relationship
(Supplementary Fig. S3a) between the median mX of the log-normalized personal estimates
and their diversity ηX , defined as the average absolute deviation from their median (respec-
2Technically, we provided the τ pieces of social information that were closest to 10Median(log(Ep)), where
Ep is the actual personal estimate provided by a subject. This is because for even sequences of numbers (in
this case 12 estimates), the log of the median is not identical to the median of the log.
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Fig. S2: Improvement in Accuracy after Social Information Exchange in the pilot ex-
periment :
Relative improvement in (a) collective accuracy and (b) individual accuracy, against the number
of estimates exchanged, in the Random (black), Median (blue) and Shifted-Median (red) exchange
treatments, in the pilot experiment. Collective accuracy in the Median and Shifted-Median ex-
changes is much lower than in the second experiment (see Main Text, Fig. 2a), especially in the
Median exchange for τ = 5 and 7. This can be explained by the linear selection of the pieces of
social information. To illustrate, imagine that the 12 personal estimates were the 12 first powers
of 10: Ep = 10
{0,1...11}. For the individual who answered 104, the 3 estimates which log are closest
to the median of the log estimates (log scale)—except 104—are 105, 106 and 107, while the esti-
mates closest to the median (linear scale)—except 104—are 102, 103 and 105 (a similar example
could be imagined for the Shifted-Median exchange). This example shows that using a linear scale
inadequately favors low estimates, further emphasizing the importance to use the log scale when
dealing with large numbers. This result does however show that it is possible to influence subjects’
estimates in the wrong direction, by driving second estimates away from the truth.
tively the maximum likelihood estimators of the center and width of Laplace distributions3):
mX ∼ γX ηX , (S1)
with γX < 0 the slope of the linear regression line.
Let us note m and η the median and diversity of log estimates (i.e. not normalized by the
3As explained in the Main Text, Materials and Methods, distributions of log (and log-normalized) estimates
for most quantities are close to Laplace distributions.
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Fig. S3: Linear relationship between the Median and Diversity of the log-normalized
estimates:
Median of log-normalized estimates against their diversity for (a) 98 questions (one dot per question)
taken from a former study [27] and (b, c) 36 questions from the pilot experiment. Among the 36
questions, 18 were already asked in the above cited study (b) and 18 were new (c). The slopes of the
linear regression lines are −0.63 (a), −0.74 (b) and −0.63 (c), underlining the consistency of this
linear trend. Note that negative values of the median reflect the level of collective underestimation.
true value). They are related to mX and ηX by:
mX = m− log(T ) (S2)
ηX = η (S3)
Equation S1 thus becomes:
m− log(T ) ∼ γX η. (S4)
We then defined, for each group and each question (12 estimates), an expected approximation
T ′ (shifted-median) of the true value T , such that: log(T
′
T
) = mX − γX ηX ∼ 0 (using
equation (S1)), or equivalently: log(T ′) = m − γX η (using equation (S4)). Finally we have
an expression of the shifted-median4 value T ′, free from any reference to the true value:
T ′ = 10m−γX η. (S5)
4Notice that since γX < 0, T
′ > 10m ≈ Median(Ep) is indeed higher than the median of the personal
estimates.
6
To compare the performance of this method with that used in the main experiment, we
investigated how well both approximated the true values of the 98 questions asked in [27].
To make the questions comparable, we respectively defined the quantities (mX − γX ηX) and(
m
γ
− log(T )
)
(with γ = 0.9, as measured in Main Text, Fig. 1a), following equations S1
and the relation m = γ log(T ) (see Main Text, Materials and Methods), respectively. These
quantities are equivalent and represent the deviation of the shifted-median value from the
true value, and equal 0 when the former equals the latter (i.e. no deviation).
Distributions of both quantities are plotted in Supplementary Fig. S4, and show that
the first method (brown line, as the dots in Supplementary Fig. S3) approximates the truth
slightly more closely than the second one (green line, as the dots in Main Text, Fig. 1), as the
corresponding distribution is more centred and peaked on 0. However, both methods work
very well, and given that the second method is more straightforward and easier to implement,
we decided to use it for the main experiment.
3 List of Questions
Below is the list of questions used in the experiment and the corresponding true values T . In
the original experiment, the questions were asked in German. Questions were a mix of general
knowledge questions and estimating the number of objects (e.g. marbles, matches, animals)
in an image. Images were shown for 6 seconds. 18 questions were taken from a previous
study [27], and 18 were new (shown in italic). Questions 21 and 32 were the same in [27], but
were asked in different units, such that the true answer and corresponding estimates were
substantially different. Therefore, we considered these as new.
1. What is the population of Tokyo and its agglomeration? T = 38, 000, 000
2. What is the population of Shanghai and its agglomeration? T = 25, 000, 000
3. What is the population of Seoul and its agglomeration? T = 26, 000, 000
7
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Fig. S4: Adequacy of both Methods: Distributions of deviations of the shifted-median values
from the truth (0 means that the shifted-median equals the truth, negative values mean that the
shifted-median underestimates the truth and positive values that the shifted-median overestimates
the truth), computed for 98 quantities to estimate (taken from [27]) following two different methods:
(i) using a linear relationship between the median mX and diversity ηX of log-normalized personal
estimates Xp (in brown; method used in the pilot experiment) and (ii) using a linear relationship
between the median personal log estimate m and the log of the true value T (in green; method used
in the final experiment presented in the main text).
4. What is the population of New-York City and its agglomeration? T = 21, 000, 000
5. What is the population of Madrid and its agglomeration? T = 6, 500, 000
6. What is the population of Melbourne and its agglomeration? T = 4, 500, 000
7. How many ebooks were sold in Germany in 2016? T = 28 , 100 , 000
8. How many books does the American library of Congress hold? T = 16, 000, 000
9. How many people died from cancer in the world in 2015? T = 8, 800, 000
10. How many smartphones were sold in Germany in 2017? T = 24 , 100 , 000
11. What was the total distance of the 2016 Tour de France (in kilometers)? T = 3 , 529
12. How many insured cars were stolen in Germany in 2016? T = 18 , 227
8
13. Marbles 1: How many marbles do you think are in the jar in the following image?
T = 100
14. Marbles 2: How many marbles do you think are in the jar in the following image?
T = 450
15. Matches 1: How many matches do you think are present in the following image? T =
240
16. Matches 2: How many matches do you think are present in the following image? T =
480
17. How many people identify as indigenous in Mexico? T = 6 , 000 , 000
18. How many cars were registered in Germany in 2016? T = 45 , 071 , 000
19. What is the diameter of the Sun (in kilometers)? T = 1 , 391 , 400
20. What is the distance between Earth and the Moon (in kilometers)? T = 384, 400
21. How many stars does the Milky way hold? T = 235 , 000 , 000 , 000
22. How many kilometers is one light-year (in billion kilometers)? T = 9, 460
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23. How much is the per-day income of Mark Zuckerberg (in dollars)? T = 4 , 400 , 000
24. How many cells are there in the human body (in billion cells)? T = 100, 000
25. How many bees do you think are in this picture? T = 976
26. What is the average annual salary of a player in the Bundesliga (in euros)? T = 1 , 456 , 565
27. How many gnus do you think are in this picture? T = 483
28. How many bikes do you think there are in Germany? T = 62 , 000 , 000
29. What is the distance from planet Mercury to the Sun (in kilometers)? T = 58, 000, 000
30. What is the total length of the metal threads used in the braided cables of the Golden
Gate Bridge (in kilometers)? T = 129, 000
31. What is the mass of the pyramid of Kheops (in tons)? T = 5, 000, 000
32. How much did the building of the Burj Khalifa tower in Dubai cost (in dollars)?
T = 1 , 500 , 000 , 000
33. What is the average salary for players at Bayern Munich (in euros)? T = 5 , 460 , 000
34. What is the distance from Berlin to New-York (in kilometers)? T = 6 , 188
35. How many tourists were recorded in France in 2016? T = 82 , 600 , 000
36. How many UFO sightings have been reported to the National UFO Reporting Center in
its history? T = 90 , 000
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4 Computation of the Error Bars
The error bars indicate the variability of our results depending on the 36 questions presented
to the subjects. We call x0 the actual measurement of a quantity appearing in the figures
by considering all N questions asked. Then, we generate the results of N ′ = 1, 000 new
effective experiments. For each effective experiment indexed by n = 1, ..., N ′, we randomly
draw Q = N questions among the N questions asked (so that some questions can appear
several times, and others may not appear) and recompute the quantity of interest which now
takes the value xn. The upper error bar b+ for x0 is defined so that C = 68, 3 % (by analogy
with the usual standard deviation for a normal distribution) of the xn greater than x0 are
between x0 and x0 + b+. Similarly, the lower error bar b− is defined so that C = 68, 3 % of
the xn lower than x0 are between x0− b− and x0. The introduction of these upper and lower
confidence intervals is adapted to the case were the distribution of the xn is unknown and
potentially not symmetric.
5 Model Description
In our model, a simulation5 mimics the main features of our experiment: 12 agents pro-
vide personal estimates to 36 questions. For each question, after all personal estimates
have been provided, agents receive 1 to 11 estimates, selected according to one of the three
exchange structures (Random, Median and Shifted-Median exchange), and then provide a
re-estimation.
We consider log-normalized estimates X = log
(
E
T
)
. For each question, log-normalized
personal estimates Xp are drawn from Laplace distributions [47], which center and width
are the median and average absolute deviation from the median of the experimental log-
normalized estimates, respectively. Supplementary Fig. S5a shows the distribution of log-
normalized estimates from the data (green, as in Main Text, Fig. 1) and from model sim-
5In all graphs presented in this paper, 10.000 simulations were run.
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ulations (purple). The high agreement between both distributions underlines the relevance
of the Laplace distributions assumptions. Supplementary Fig. S5b–d show the distributions
of experimental log-normalized estimates before (dark-shaded lines) and after (light-shaded
lines) social information exchange, in all three exchange conditions. Below we refer to log-
normalized estimates as estimates, for simplicity.
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Fig. S5: Distributions of Log-Normalized Estimates: (a) Distribution of log-normalized per-
sonal estimates Xp from the data (solid green line, all data combined) and from model simulations
(dashed purple line). The quality of the agreement between data and model highlights the relevance
of the Laplace distributions assumption; (b, c and d) Distribution of experimental log-normalized
estimates in the Random (b), Median (c) and Shifted-Median (d) exchanges, before (dark shades)
and after (light shades) social information exchange. The narrowing of the distribution represents
the convergence of estimates after social information exchange, which results in improved individual
accuracy. Note that the log transform of the truth is 0.
All personal estimates are drawn before being selectively exchanged according to one of
the three exchange conditions. The model assumes that the subjects focus on the mean M
(M = log
(
G
T
)
, where G is the geometric mean of the τ pieces of social information) and
standard deviation σ of the estimates received as social information6. The rules determining
how agents integrate M and σ to update their estimates constitute the core of our model.
Our model is a generalization of the model presented in [27], that we briefly summarize
here. In [27], the authors noted that the distribution of weights S given to the mean M of
several estimates (in their experiment, subjects received the geometric mean of former ran-
domly chosen estimates) consisted of two peaks at S = 0 (agents keep their personal estimate
with probability P0) and S = 1 (agents adopt the social information with probability P1),
6Since the model uses log-normalized estimates, it assumes that real subjects actually focus on the geo-
metric mean and geometric standard deviation of the estimates received as social information, or in other
words, on the mean and standard deviation of the orders of magnitude of these estimates.
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and a central part that could roughly be assimilated to a Gaussian of mean Mg and standard
deviation σg (agents contradict, compromise with or overreact to the social information with
probability Pg). Moreover, they showed that the average weight given to the mean M of
the social information increases linearly with the distance D = M −Xp between M and the
personal estimate Xp. Individuals thus weight social information more when it is further
away from their personal estimate (distance effect). In agreement, in the current study, we
also found two peaks at S = 0 and S = 1, and a similar distance effect when exchanging a
single estimate (see Supplementary Fig. S6).
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Fig. S6: Weight S given to a single piece of social information : Distributions of the weights
subjects give to a single estimate in the (a) Random exchange, (b) Median exchange and (c) Shifted-
Median exchange. Purple dashed lines are model simulations. The distribution consists of a rough
Gaussian and two peaks at S = 0 and S = 1; (d) Average weight given to a single estimate M
against the distance D = M − Xp between M and the personal estimate Xp, in the Random
exchange (black), the Median exchange (blue) and the Shifted-Median exchange (red). Dots show
the data and dashed lines are model simulations. The average weight S increases linearly with |D|.
For a given value of D, the average weight 〈S〉 given to the social information was given
by 〈S〉 = P0 × 0 + P1 × 1 + Pg ×Mg = α + β|D|, where α and β are the coefficients of the
linear cusp relationship between 〈S〉 and D. Pg was hence given by Pg = (α+β|D|−P1)/Mg.
P1 was found to be independent of D, so P0 could be deduced to P0 = 1 − P1 − Pg. S was
then drawn, for each agent and each question, according to these three probabilities, and the
updated estimate Xs was computed as the weighted average of the personal estimate and the
social information: Xs = (1− S) Xp + S M . See [27] for more details.
When applying this model (model 0) to our data (Supplementary Fig. S7 left column),
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we observe that it fails to predict the increase in collective improvement with the number τ
of estimates exchanged, in the Random and Median exchanges.
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Fig. S7: Incremental comparison of models with the data : Dots show the data and lines
are model simulations. Model 0 (left column) contains only the distance and herding effects, and is
unable to explain the increase in collective improvement with the number τ of estimates exchanged,
in the Random (black) and Median (blue) exchanges; Model 1 (middle column) adds the asymmetry
effect, and reproduces this increase fairly. However, it fails to reproduce the relationship between
the average weight given to social information and τ (Supplementary Fig. S8 top line); Model 2
(right column) includes the similarity effect, which solves the latter issue (Supplementary Fig. S8
bottom line).
To explain this increase, the asymmetry effect needs to be added (model 1). The sim-
plest way to do so is to assume no coupling between the asymmetry effect and the distance
effect, and add a linear dependence of 〈S〉 on the number τ of estimates received as social
information, with a positive slope βτ+ when D > 0 and a negative slope βτ− when D < 0, as
suggested in Main Text, Fig. 3a. The average weight given to social information, for a certain
τ and at a certain distance D, is then given by: 〈S〉(D, τ) = α + β|D| + βτ±(τ −1), where
βτ± = βτ+ when D > 0 and βτ± = βτ− when D < 0. When τ = 1, the asymmetry effect term
disappears, such that this model (model 1) and model 0 are equivalent for a single piece of
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social information (model 1 generalizes model 0).
This model is able to reproduce the increase in collective improvement with τ in the
Random and Median exchanges (Supplementary Fig. S7 middle column). Yet, it substantially
underestimates the weight given to social information when D < 0 in these exchanges (see
Supplementary Fig. S8 top panels).
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Fig. S8: Comparative fits of the asymmetry effect in models 1 and 2 : average weight
given to social information, against the number of estimates exchanged, in the Random (black),
Median (blue) and Shifted-Median (red) exchange treatments. Shown are the values when (i)
all data are combined (dots), (ii) social information is higher than personal estimate (squares)
and (iii) social information is lower than personal estimate (triangles). Filled symbols and empty
symbols (accompanied with lines to facilitate visualization) indicate the values obtained from the
data and the model simulations, respectively. Model 2 (bottom panels), which includes the similarity
effect, is better at reproducing the empirical data than model 1 (top panels), especially when social
information is lower than personal estimate (triangles).
This problem is remedied by introducing the similarity effect in the model (model 2).
Akin to the asymmetry effect, we assume no coupling between effects, and add a linear
dependence of 〈S〉 on the dispersion σ of the estimates received. The average weight given to
social information is given by: 〈S〉(D, τ, σ) = α + β|D| + βτ±(τ−1) + βσ±(σ−σ0), where
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βσ± = βσ+ when D > 0 and βσ± = βσ− when D < 0 (the strength of the similarity effect need
not be the same when D < 0 and when D > 0). When τ = 1, σ = 0 (a single estimate has no
dispersion) and σ0 is set to 0, such that models 0, 1 and 2 are equivalent (model 2 generalizes
model 1). Model 2 fits the collective and individual improvement better (Supplementary
Fig. S7 right column), as well as the relationship between the average weight given to social
information and τ (Main Text, Fig. 3 and Supplementary Fig. S8 bottom line), confirming
that the asymmetry and similarity effects are important for describing the integration of
several estimates.
Note that the herding effect occurs if 0 < 〈S〉 < 1 and is thus only parametrization
dependent. It therefore does not need to be explicitly put into the model.
All parameters values are reported in Supplementary Table S1.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Mg 0.5 σg 0.35
α 0.2 β 0.15
βτ+ 0.03 βτ− −0.04
βσ+ −0.1 βσ− −0.3
P1 0 σ0 1
Table S1: Model parameters defined in the description of model 2.
6 Supplementary Figure
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Fig. S9: Model Simulations: (a) Optimal value of the shifted-median parameter γ, resulting in the
highest average collective or individual improvement, for different group sizes. For each group size,
the average is over all values of τ . For large groups (N > 30), the optimal γ saturates at about 0.86,
very close to the value at which it approximates the truth (γ ≈ 0.9); (b) Corresponding maximum
collective (filled dots) and individual (empty dots) improvements obtained (i.e. the highest value
over all τ s, for τ = 1 ... (N − 1)), against the group size N . For large enough groups (N > 20), the
maximum improvement is close to its highest possible value (i.e. 1), at which the group is perfectly
accurate after social information exchange (i.e. collective accuracy equals 0).
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